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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
LEHI IRRIGATION COM·P ANY, 
Plainf;ijf ood .Appellmnt, 
V!. 
CLARENCE T. J.ONES and ED. H. 
WATSON, =State Engineer of the 
State of Utah, 
Deferruklmts ~and R,es'Pondents. 
RE'SPO·NDENT'S REPLY TO 
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·Case No. 
7189 
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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
LEHI IRRIGATION COMPANY, 
Plaintiff arnd .Appelkont, 
V!. 
CLARENCE T. JONES and ED. H. 
W AT·SON, State Engineer of the 
State of Utah, 
Defenaants ~and R~espondents. 
RE'SPO·NDENT 'S REPLY T·O 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Case No. 
7189 
The petition for rehearing, except on Point 1, as 
to evidence, raise.s no matter of law or fact not hereto-
for~argned at length by amicus curine and considered 
by the court. 
While mentioning that this is ·an appeal from the 
District Court, the petition ignores the fact that the 
matters again attempted to be rais·ed and discussed, were 
not in the trial court or reserved for consideration by this 
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court, on appeal, at all. The argument again emphasizes 
the fact that, as between the actual parties to this ac-
tion, and on the question decided and reserved, the de-
cisions of the trial court, and of this court, are correct. 
This petition, erroneously, ignores the settled prin-
ciples, (a) that questions not presented and reserved in 
the trial court are not available on ap~p~eal (3 Am. Jur. 
p. 25), (b) that, except where interests litigated below 
have .been succeeded to by death of a party or by suc-
cession, as in changes in officials, the only p~rties who 
can be heard, ~n the questions reserved, are those in the 
trial court (2 Am. Jur. p. 941), and (c) that. rights of 
others are in no way affected or. prejudiced by the judg-
ment or the appeal. 
If confusion is to be avoided, it is ve_ry ·important 
to adhere to the plain and established p·rocedure under 
our water laws, that (a) if a party does not protest an 
application, his rights are unaffected by any order of 
the State Engineer thereon thereafter, (b) that he is, 
therefore, not aggrieved by the order, and does not have 
a right of ap·peal therefrom, the statute providing that 
any such order is subject to ''all prior rights'', (c) that 
parties aggrieved may appeal and have a trial de nova, 
and (d) that such trial is one ''in equity generally'', and, 
therefore, the· rules referred to in the preceding para-
graph apply. 
The petition seeks to pick out certain statements of 
the court, and ·assume effects of the decision· not justi-
fied, and, by twisting thes·e, seeks grounds of unjustifi-
able criticism. 
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We will refer to each ground of this ·petition briefly, 
and \Yill cite our first brief, by use of th~ letter '' F' ', and 
our brief in reply to amicus curiae brief, by use of the 
letter "R ". 
1. The statement by the court that the engineer's 
letter was the ''foundation of this appeal (from the State 
Engineer) and the trial (thereafter) de nov.a in the 
District Court, is entirely correct''. This is an appeal 
from the District Court, but the foundation was just as 
it was stated. 
The letter embraced the EnginHer's findings. With-
out objection, and by understanding between the parties 
to the action, it was introduced to establish the facts 
which his investigation had revealed to him. T,echnically, 
perhaps, the defendant might have required us to p·ut 
him on the. stand, to introduce these facts. This was not 
insisted upon. No point of error is preserved. Nor do 
we believe that these facts were ''neither relevant or 
material''. 
As held in the Terry case, 77 P. (2) at 366, that on 
this proceeding, ''the court stands in the same position 
as the Engineer''. It is true that neither he nor the 
trial court "considered the rights of the United States", 
or the rights of many other peop,le who may be interested 
in Utah Lake drainage. That is one reason why these 
cannot be considered here. And no such rights are, in 
the least, affected by what has been decided. 
2. This court did not say that its decision was ''con-
trolled by the pronouncement in Little Cottonwood'', etc. 
It merely cited this case, among others, as supporting 
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its decision, and affirmed the rule announced by all of 
these. (202 P. (2) at 893, Par. 2) 
As we pointed out (R. 15-18), there is nothing in 
the 1939 amendments calling for any change in the rule, 
as announced in all these cases, and here. At least two 
of these other cases, cited by this court, were decided 
.long after 1939. 
And, notwithstanding that the court here again 
points out that "The prop:osed· source" of the water, as 
referred to in 100-3-8, is. the springs here, petitioner 
persists in ignoring this vital fact. 
Another point that is fatal to all of petitioner's argu-
m·ents on this statute and as to "uwapp~o1pvriated w~ater" 
is that the Weber River Application and Application 
No. 12144 on the Lake, and the approval thereof, have 
appropriated no water. That any waters referred to 
therein are '' unap·propriated'' until final proof and certi-
fication of appropriation. Further, that the trial court, 
and this court, cannot here determine water rights at 
all, or what is, or what the appropriated water rights of 
these applicants may be, or are. 
• I 
3. We do not understand that this court held that 
''the waters in question are those within the scope of 
approved 'Application 12144". The court said only that 
this exchange application "indicates some interest in 
the seepage water which returned to Utah Lake", and 
then points out some reasons why this spring water may 
never be within Application 12144, and that the applica-
tions here may even result in helping the supply ther·e-
under. The court also points out reasons why it cannot 
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decide this lake question here, and without prop·er ''pro-
j 
ceeding·s, arguments, and parties, which may be adversely 
affected''~ 
4. It is complained that the court here held "that, 
as between the owners of an approved application for 
a right to use 'vater and 'a subsequent application for a 
right to use from the same source'', the burden is upon 
the former to establish "interference or conflict". 
Further, that the waters of the Jones application "have 
been definitely determined to be those covered by No. 
12144". 
We cannot find where the court so held, either as 
to the parties, or as to the source of water here, or that 
it had ever been ''determined'' what water rights exist 
under No. 12144. We are certain that this determina-
tion has not been made. We think the burden will be on 
the party seeking to establish his right on his final proof. 
The court, with great p·atience and courtesy to am.i-
cus curiae, went outside of the issues here to discuss the 
claims made, and to enlighten amicus cur+bae, and made it 
clear, at some length, that there is no issue or proper 
proceedings or parties for the determination of the 
things discussed on these other ap·plications. 
5. The point raised by this number is simply a re-
iteration of that raised under number 4. Again, we can-
not see where the court has held, what it is there claimed. 
Reference is made under this number, again, to the 
Weber or "foreign water shed filings". That is, appar-
ently, the "near source", again erroneously so referred 
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to by petitioner. Those filings are in no way before the 
court. 
We cited, at some length, authorities (R. 8-12) that 
a person, having an actual right to the use of water, may 
not object to its use by another, when such owner is 
not in position to, or is not making a beneficial use there-
of. There has been no appropriation of this water under 
any of these filings, or at all. 
It is clear, and without dispute (Tr. 9, 13, 14, 23), 
that the increase in these _Jones springs (''proposed 
source'') results mainly from irrigation by defendant 
under his previous rights, and as supplemented by his 
rights as a stockholder in this project. That such irriga-
tion is on his own higher lands, and on the same tract of 
land in which the springs arise. This is the near source 
of supply. 
And, as pointed out by the Court, there is a ques-
tion, not yet presented, as to whether the owners of either 
the Weber Applications or No. 12144 can ever claim this 
water,.or interfere with defendant's use of it. This ques-
tion could come up in the general adjudication suit pend-
ing, or, possibly, when the attempt to make final proof 
and acquire certificate of appropriation is made on these 
Weber and Utah Lake filings, or on ours. How can this 
project use other peoples' lands for run off or swamp 
storage of seeping waters~ 
6. For reasons already stated, there is no merit 
in petitioner's ground 6. The reservation of these mat-
ters, ''until a proper case'' is presented, was, obviously, 
proper and necessary. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
In this connection, the opinion here, in attempting 
to go as far as possible to explain the contentions of 
anli.czt,s culria.e, says something with relation to judicial 
notice of records, which we think may prove embarrass-
ing. 
While this, in no way, affects the decision here, as 
the Court indicated, we are concerned about its affect 
upon future litigation, and, therefore, consider it our 
duty to present our views. This is somewhat in the role 
of amicus curiae, because it arose in discussion of mat-
ters not actually here involv:ed. 
If this matter of judicial knowledge, as stated by 
the court, is limited to the purpose of noticing records 
for discussion of the irrelevant ~uggestions of :amicus 
curiae, merely, of course, it could do no harm. But, if 
this he followed as a guide in future water litigation&, 
we fear that it would result in nothing hut trouble and 
confusion for the courts and litigants. 
The opinion says (202 P. (2) at 895), "the State 
Engineer had before him ... his own records''. These, 
''reveal that there were approved applications which 
brought about this (Deer Creek) water, and also an ex-
change application which indicates some interest ... in 
the seepage water which returned to Utah Lake. In addi-
tion, he had ... knowledge of this matter as it developed 
. 
in' ' the Tan.ner case. 
Then, after stating that none of these records were 
ever put before the trial court, the opinion says, ''by 
virtue of S~ec. 104-46-1(3), as interpreted in'' State Lwnd 
Board v. Ririe, 56 Utah 213., "it is clear that judicial 
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knowledge may he taken of tthese doCUtmernts as publric 
reoords. Thus, it is immaterial that they were not in-
troduced in evidence''. 
This matter is too big for full briefing here. In our 
second brief ( R. 18-21), we cited three Utah cas·es hold-
ing that neither the trial court nor this court could take 
judicial notice of their records in another and different 
case, and that neither court can, in another case, take 
notice of a ''determination of water rights filed by the 
State Engineer with the Clerk of the Court", where such 
document was not vle1aded in the case under considera-
tion. The document there involved was, by statute, re-
quired to he made and kept of record in the ~tate En~ 
gineer 's O·ffice, and a copy filed in the supervising court. 
We are aware that such determination was not a final 
adjudication of the water rights involved, until approved 
by the court, but neither is an application to appropriate 
water, or the approval thereof, an adjudication of water 
rights. 
The first point we suggest on this is that judicial 
notice is a rule of evidence. It simply relieves a party 
Jitigant of proof of some allegations of fact, upon which 
he relies. (20 Am. Jur. p. 47) 
If, a.s indicated by the Utah decisions referred to 
above, the document or record is not pleaded as a basis 
of claim, or presented as an issue in the litigation, it 
could not properly he judicially noticed therein. Such 
notice, it seems, could not inj·ect, esp.ecially on final ap-
peal, new claims or issues, and, particularly, a possible 
claim by parties foreign to the litigation. We do not 
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believe that this eourt intended to indicate that it could. 
The contrary appears to be indicated in other portions 
of the opinion. 
The trial judge had rejected the applications as not 
being relevant or material. His ruling was not reserved 
or presented here. There clearly was no claim or issue 
pleaded as to these. If that court had been asked to 
judicially notice them, his ruling is indicated by the one 
he made in rejecting them. Thus, it seems clear that this 
Court cannot rightly consider them on appeal from the 
trial court's judgment. 
The above quoted statements appear as dicta. They 
are to the effect that documents or records in the State 
Engineer's Office may be judicially noticed, ·though not 
brought to the attention of the trial court, or offered at 
the trial. We think this indication is very serious, even 
if these documents did bear upon issues between the 
parties, as raised by their pleadings. 
The State Engineer's Office has numerous records. 
He has taken thousands of measurements on water 
sources throughout the State. There have been hundreds 
of statements and rulings contained in letters by dif-
ferent holders of this office. Some of thes·e,· as to the 
same waters, are conflicting and hard to reconcile. 
This suggestion will, also, affect general adjudica-
tion suits. Can a water user, having, or asserting, some 
general claim in the trial court, leave the court to search 
the Engineer's Office, or, on appeal, leave this court to do 
so, for supporting or conflicting evidence~ Or can the 
attorneys in any water litigation rely upon these records 
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without bringing them to the attention of the trial court? 
We doubt that the Engineer himself, in any hear-
ing, should be required· to examine back over all his rec-
ords, or be confronted, on appeal, with something not 
brought to his attention by the parties. 
We call· attention now that 104-46-1(3) does not 
m·ention notice of "public records", or "documents". 
It does mention ''official acts of the ... executive" and 
the other two ·departrnents of the State, as something 
that may be judicially noticed. 
The Constitution creates the three departm-ents, and 
says (Art. VII, Sec. 1), this executive department "shall 
consist of'' the elective State officers, there named. 
The Ririe case cited (56 Utah 213), said nothing about 
noticing records. It held that the court could take judi-
cial knowledge that the Land Board and Auditor had 
bought ·town bonds, as State investments, and said the 
court ''is authorized to take . . . judicial. knowledge of 
the Mt:s and p,-,oceedings of the two offices''. That both 
are "parts and parcels of the' executive department". 
This last was true, as applied to the Auditor. 
As stated before, it is not necessary for us to argue 
this matter. We merely call it to the attention of the 
court for such consideration as it may be worth. 
7 .. Under this number, petitioner complains of the 
statement of the court that no vested rights with which 
plaintiff's. applications will interfere." are called to the 
attention of the court''. 
· This ·statement, of course,. is· entirely correct. None 
of the applications here discussed, or the_approval there-
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of, establish any vested rights, or any water rights, or 
any actual appropriation of water. -It is for this reason 
that the cases cited on this petition, dealing with conflicts 
with vested water rights, have no bearing here. Nor is 
there anything that destroys, or in the least relates to, 
what "'"as decided in Tanrner v. Beacom, or that affects 
any claim of the clients of amicus curiae, whoever they 
are, and they are in no way prejudiced. 
The Tanner case held two things. One, that th·e 
statutory power of the Engineer to withhold app·roval 
of an application in the interest of ·public welfare was 
properly exercised. 
It also held that 100-3-21, the priority section, '' ap-
plies only to vested rights, and not to the right to appro-
priate water in the future" (p. 962), and that "the doc-
trine of res ajudieata does not operate to affect strangers 
to a judgment". (p. 959) 
These holdings are in harmony with all previous de-
cisions as we have heretofore and hereinabove attempted 
to ·point out. The latter are applicable to the matters 
argued here. 
Mr. Clyde, who appeared as attorney for the State 
Engineer on our first brief, has since resigned his posi-
tion. 
We respectfully submit that the petition for re-
hearing should be denied. 
MULLINER, PRINCE and MULLINER 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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